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Abstract
We provide additional evidence on the relationship between uncertainty and economic 
activity. For this purpose, we gather and construct a wide range of proxy indicators of 
economic and economic policy uncertainty from Spain. We distinguish between the 
relative merits of different types of measures based on: (i) the volatility of fi nancial markets; 
(ii) economic analysts’ disagreement; (iii) economic policy uncertainty. We show that the 
fi rst and the third block of measures are the most relevant to grasp the negative effects of 
unexpected changes in uncertainty on aggregate economic developments, as measured 
by real GDP. In addition, we fi nd that economic policy uncertainty and fi nancial uncertainty 
shocks produce visible negative effects on private consumption. The negative responses on 
capital goods investments are initially bigger in magnitude but vanish more quickly.
Keywords: economic uncertainty, economic policy uncertainty, impact of uncertainty shocks.
JEL classifi cation: D8, C43, E2, E3.
Resumen
En este documento proporcionamos nueva evidencia acerca del impacto de la incertidumbre 
sobre la actividad económica. Para ello construimos, utilizamos y desarrollamos un conjunto 
amplio de indicadores sobre la incertidumbre económica y sobre las políticas económicas, para 
el caso de la economía española. Las medidas se agrupan en tres bloques: i) volatilidad de los 
mercados fi nancieros; ii) desacuerdo entre los agentes económicos, y iii) incertidumbre sobre 
las políticas económicas. Los aumentos inesperados de la incertidumbre (perturbaciones 
asociadas a los indicadores) afectan negativamente al crecimiento económico, medido por 
el crecimiento del PIB real, en particular las de los bloques i) y iii). Además, en este trabajo se 
muestra que las perturbaciones en las medidas de incertidumbre sobre las políticas económica 
y fi nanciera producen efectos negativos signifi cativos en el consumo privado. Finalmente, la 
respuesta de la inversión en equipo es más pronunciada en el corto plazo, pero presenta un 
efecto menos persistente.
Palabras clave: incertidumbre económica, incertidumbre sobre la política económica, 
shocks de incertidumbre.
Códigos JEL: D8, C43, E2, E3.
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1 Introduction
Since the end of the financial crisis, a number of geopolitical events have brought to the
forefront of the policy discussion the risks that heightened economic uncertainty may pose
for global economic prospects. Most recent events include the unexpected results of the
UK referendum on the EU (the so-called Brexit) and the hurdle around subsequent UK-EU
negotiations, the political situation in Italy since the Constitutional referendum of 2016,
or the vagaries around the recent trade protectionist measures and trends. In the case of
Europe, some specific factors have shed additional doubts on the strengths of the EU project,
including policy responses to the refugee crisis, political threats to the euro project, or the
willingness and ability of peripheral countries to implement structural reforms and commit
credibly to their fiscal consolidation plans. In addition, uncertainty has been frequently
quoted as a fundamental reason for the weak global recovery from the financial crisis (see
Moore (2017), and the references quoted therein).
By now, it is well established in the theoretical and empirical literature that heightened
economic uncertainty has the potential to harm economic activity (see, among others, Guiso
and Parigi, 1999; Bloom, 2009; Mumtaz and Zanetti, 2013; Christiano et al., 2014; Bloom,
2014). The latter may occur through various channels, particularly through effects on house-
hold consumption and saving decisions (precautionary savings), or on firms’ investment and
hiring decisions.
Different measures have been used to assess the effects of economic uncertainty in a
number of economies, including the US (see, e.g. Bloom, 2009; Caggiano et al., 2017; Charles
et al., 2018), the UK (Denis and Kannan, 2013; Haddow et al., 2013), Germany (Bachmann
et al., 2013), Australia (Moore, 2017), Turkey (Arslan et al., 2015), Spain (Posada et al., 2014;
Gil et al., 2017; Basile and Girardi, 2017), or Ireland (Zalla, 2017), among others.1 They
show that uncertainty shocks hamper real GDP. Finally, Meinen and Roehe (2017) study
the impact of uncertainty on investment dynamics for the four largest euro-area countries
(Germany, France, Italy and Spain) using five different uncertainty indexes available in the
literature: i.e. a measure of implied stock market volatility (Bloom, 2009), a survey-based
1See also Castelnuovo et al. (2017) for a short review of the most recent literature.
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measure of expectations dispersion (Bachmann et al., 2013), the text-based Economic Policy
Uncertainty (EPU) index (Baker et al., 2016), and two indicators of uncertainty based on
the unpredictable components of several macroeconomic series (Jurado et al., 2015; Rossi
and Sekhposyan, 2015).
Against this framework, we propose a number of measures of macroeconomic uncertainty
for Spain, based on the following procedure. First, we select a number of single uncertainty
indexes that pertain to different domains, i.e. indicators related to the financial markets, in-
dicators capturing the degree of disagreement based on agents’ expectations, and indicators
about economic policy uncertainty. Second, we build synthetic indicators that combine in-
formation from all these indicators by means of a principal component analysis (PCA). That
is, we do not take any a priori position on the relative relevance of the specific uncertainty
indexes to represent aggregate uncertainty, but rather exploit all of them at once. This
allows a picture which is more complete and subject to lower volatility of the uncertainty in
the Spanish economy than that which can be provided by single indicators taken one by one.
This empiricist approach is in line with the methodology used in Jurado et al. (2015) and
Rossi and Sekhposyan (2015), which proxy uncertainty with errors from forecasting several
macroeconomic variables, or of Charles et al. (2018), which construct a synthetic index of
uncertainty for the US based on dynamic factor models.
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we construct three synthetic indi-
cators of macroeconomic uncertainty for Spain, each one related to a specific domain: one
indicator of uncertainty related to financial markets, an indicator capturing the degree of dis-
agreement between agents about future economic prospects, and one indicator of economic
policy uncertainty. For each of these indicators we extract information from different sets of
individual uncertainty indicators. Some of them are borrowed from the literature, while the
others are constructed by us. We document that our synthetic indicators react differently to
relevant events commonly related to uncertainty, depending on the nature of the informa-
tion they rely on. This is reasonable and reminds that a meaningful interpretation of results
based on uncertainty measures hinges upon a good understanding of the type of information
fed into the index in the first place.
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creases in the different sources of uncertainty on economic activity, by means of structural
vector autoregressive (SVAR) analysis, using as sample of reference the period 1997Q1-
2018Q2. We find that unanticipated positive shocks in financial uncertainty and in economic
policy uncertainty cause a significant and quite persistent drop in real GDP and private
consumption. The negative responses of capital goods investments are initially bigger in
magnitude but vanish more quickly.
The literature for the Spanish case is quite scarce - see Basile and Girardi (2017) and the
references quoted therein. Our results are in line with those obtained with similar exercises,
even though our scope is significantly broader, most notably as regards the measures of
uncertainty used in the different analyses.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the data sources
and methodology to construct the individual indicators of uncertainty. Section 3 presents
our synthetic measures of uncertainty, and provide some stylized facts based on the latter.
In Section 4 we turn to set up and estimate an empirical SVAR model to capture the impact
of unexpected increases of economic uncertainty on the economy. Finally, in Section 5 we
provide the main conclusions of the paper.
2 Measuring uncertainty
We construct our three synthetic measures of macroeconomic uncertainty combining infor-
mation from three domain-specific sets of individual indexes of uncertainty by means of PCA.
Note that the uncertainty measures used in this article refer to a broad definition of uncer-
tainty, defined as the lack of complete information about the future trajectory of economic
activity and future economic policy stances, as it is standard in the economic literature on
uncertainty. This encompasses both concepts of risk and Knightian uncertainty.2
The second contribution of the paper is that we estimate the effects of unexpected in-
2The latter refers to a situation in which the future outcome of an event is unknown, and in addition one
cannot extract from past experience information in order to set up a probability distribution function that
assigns probabilities to future potential states of the world. Hence, one cannot compute the odds of an event.
By contrast, risk refers to a situation in which it is possible to construct a probability distribution function
that assigns probabilities to potential outcomes. That is, the future outcome of an event is unknown but
the odds of this event can be computed based on current information.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 10 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1905
Table 1: Single indicators of uncertainty
Starts in: Mean Persistence‡ Kurtosis Skewness
All§ Rec./Exp.† All Rec./Exp.
I Indicators of uncertainty in financial markets
IBEX-35 volatility Mar-97 23.70 (29.2 - 20.4) 0.86 (0.90-0.85) 3.68 0.82
IBEX-35 volatility index Dec-99 101.58 (119.5 - 90.8) 0.82 (0.86-0.82) 2.68 0.25
Exchange rate $/e volatility index Dec-99 89.64 (119.5 - 77.7) 0.83 (0.87-0.84) 3.99 0.09
Brent price volatility index Dec-99 81.89 (74.9 - 86.1) 0.86 (0.78-0.80) 3.23 -0.08
10 year bond Spanish government volatility index Dec-99 99.09 (162 - 61.3) 0.90 (0.86-0.85) 3.18 0.34
II Indicators of economic disagreement
Disagreement on GDP forecasts ∗ Jan-99 0.05 (0.10 - 0.02) 0.78 (0.78-0.74) 13.72 3.15
Disagreement on private consumption forecasts ∗ Jan-99 0.16 (0.28 - 0.09) 0.86 (0.91-0.83) 13.18 3.04
Disagreement on equipment investment forecasts ∗ Jan-99 3.61 (6.42 - 1.92) 0.93 (0.96-0.87) 10.85 2.84
Uncertainty about unemployment expectations ∗ Jun-86 0.45 (0.46 - 0.44) 0.92 (0.83-0.81) 1.97 0.28
Uncertainty about industry order-book levels ∗ Jan-93 0.57 (0.59 - 0.56) 0.58 (0.61-0.55) 2.97 -0.18
Uncertainty about industry production expectations ∗ Jan-93 0.53 (0.55 - 0.52) 0.38 (0.25-0.35) 3.04 -0.11
III Indicators of economic policy uncertainty
Current political situation indicator Jan-96 28.36 (29.3 - 29.8) 0.98 (0.92-0.91) 1.55 -0.24
Political expectations indicator Jan-96 44.78 (43.1 - 45.8) 0.88 (0.74-0.81) 2.97 0.31
Political risk indicator Jan-84 73.40 (72.0 - 74.3) 0.99 (0.97-0.96) 1.80 -0.23
Economic policy uncertainty indicator ∗ †-† Jan-97 118.78 (133.5 - 109.9) 0.87 (0.71-0.75) 4.37 0.93
Disagreement on public deficit forecasts ∗ Jan-99 0.24 (0.43 - 0.13) 0.89 (0.90-0.88) 15.00 3.25
Disagreement on public consumption forecasts∗ Jan-99 0.69 (1.30 - 0.33) 0.71 (0.80-0.75) 63.97 7.19
Notes: Sources: Bloomberg, IESE, FUNCAS, European Commission, CIS barometer, PRS Goup, and own elaboration.
∗: Indicators marked with an asterisk are based on our own elaboration.
†-†: based on Ghirelli et al. (2018).
§: Column All provides the corresponding statistic of each indicator considering the entire period.
†: Column Rec./Exp. provides the corresponding statistic distinguishing between recessions and expansions. Recessionary
periods are defined based on the expansions and recessions chronology proposed by the Business Cycle Dating Committee of
the Spanish Economic Association.
‡: Persistence is measured by the auto-correlation coefficient of an AR(1) model.
This Section outlines the single uncertainty indexes we select to build our synthetic
uncertainty indicators (Section 2.1), and then presents a descriptive analysis of the single
uncertainty indexes (section 2.2).
2.1 Single indicators of uncertainty
The single uncertainty indexes we select to build our synthetic uncertainty indicators are
grouped into three categories as shown in Table 1: (a) indicators based on financial market
data (group I); (b) indicators based on the degree of disagreement between economic agents
regarding the economic outlook (group II); and (c) indicators of uncertainty about economic
policy and about the political situation of the country (group III).
The financial measures (group I) have the advantage of being readily available in real time
and directly comparable across countries. As for the indicators of disagreement between eco-
nomic agents in group II, they rely on the hypothesis that an increase in uncertainty would,
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under certain conditions, broaden the range of possible future results, which in turn widens
the dispersion of agents’ expectations. Based on this idea, we compute the degree of disagree-
ment between economic experts, which is based on the dispersion of expectations between
the analysts contributing to FUNCAS forecast panels.3 In addition we calculate similar
measures of disagreement between consumers and firms. These are based on the opinion-
based surveys carried out monthly by the Joint Harmonised EU Programme of Business and
Consumer Surveys of the European Commission.4
Finally, the measures in group III refer to political expectations and opinions, the “po-
litical risk” (which is a weighted index of a number of factors such as government stability,
socio-economic conditions, and the quality of institutions) and variables proxying the degree
of economic policy uncertainty. In particular, we consider three indicators to proxy eco-
nomic policy uncertainty. First, we compute a new and improved version of the well-known
economic policy uncertainty (EPU) index by Baker et al. (2016) for Spain.5 This index is
based on monthly searches in the press and represents the volume of newspapers’ articles
that simultaneously contain words related with the notion of “uncertainty”, “economy”,
and “policy”. Second, we construct two indicators of disagreement, both based on a set of
economic experts’ forecasts responding to the FUNCAS forecast panels: one related to the
disagreement about budget deficit forecasts and another on the disagreement over govern-
ment consumption forecasts.6 The rest of the section briefly outlines the single uncertainty
indicators and how they are constructed.
3FUNCAS is a private sector institute that has been compiling forecasters’ views of the Spanish economy
since 1999. For more information on the panel see https://www.funcas.es/Indicadores/Index.aspx. In
the Spanish case, the use of this panel of experts instead of the one elaborated by Consensus Economics is
warranted, given the longer sample size available, the fact that it covers more variables of interest and also
that it is publicly available.
4Note that we focus on measures that proxy disagreement about the economic outlook, as it is standard
in the literature. In equilibrium, these measures might capture not only uncertainty about real economic
developments, but also uncertainty about the evolution of prices. Alternatively, one could also add indicators
that measure directly the nominal side of the economy.
5For details about the new EPU index for Spain and its comparison with the original one, see Ghirelli
et al. (2018).
6Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (2015) develop an alternative measure of uncertainty related to fiscal policy
and study how it affects the business cycle. On the ability of economic agents to learn how to anticipate
future fiscal policy stances based on government policy announcements, see Paredes et al. (2015).
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2.1.1 Group I: Financial markets
Volatility of the Spanish Stock Market (IBEX-35): it is the monthly average of
the daily volatility of IBEX35 as reported by Bloomberg.
Components of the the IESE Index on Economic Uncertainty (I3E): i.e. the
IBEX-35 volatility index, the $/e exchange-rate volatility index, the oil Brent price quoted
in dollars volatility index, and the 10 years Spanish government bond volatility index. All
these indexes are constructed every month by the International Center for Decision Making
(ICDM) of the IESE Business School. These measures are used by the ICDM to construct
the IESE Index on Economic Uncertainty (I3E).7
2.1.2 Group II: Economic Disagreement
Disagreement measures based on experts’ forecasts: we take as starting point the
month t cross-section of current and one-year-ahead forecasts about a number of national
accounts’ aggregates (e.g. GDP, private consumption and capital goods investment) pro-
duced by analysts contributing to the FUNCAS panel.8 At each point in time, the measure
of disagreement is computed as the standard deviation of such cross-section of n forecasters








. Given that each analyst
i provides growth rates of two fixed-event (fe) forecasts m months ahead (for the current
and next years), it is necessary to correct each time-t value by the fact that it is computed
on an evolving information set. Thus, in line with the literature, we compute fixed-horizon
(fh) (e.g., one-year-ahead) forecasts. fh forecasts are preferable to fe for the analysis of
disagreement because the forecasting horizon of fixed-event forecasts varies from month to
month and consequently their uncertainty and cross-sectional dispersion is strongly seasonal.
For the calculation of fh forecasts we follow the methodology of ?, as follows:
F fhy0,m,12 (x) =
12−m+ 1
12




7The I3E indicator reflects the variation in the daily growth rate of these underlying components. It is
published monthly on the second Tuesday of the month, or on the first available working day if this Tuesday
is a holiday (see https://blog.iese.edu/icdm/que-es-el-i3e/).
8See Footnote 3.
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To give an example, the forecast of the growth rate of variable x (i.e. GDP, private
consumption or capital goods investment) between May (m = 5) 2017 and May 2018 is
given by the weighted average of the (current) May 2017 forecast F fey0,m,y0 (x) and of the
(year-ahead) May 2018 forecast F fey0,m,y0+1 (x) provided by the panelists, weighted by 8/12 y
4/12, respectively.
Uncertainty measures based on opinion-based surveys: These indexes are based
on the Joint Harmonised EU Programme of Business and Consumer Surveys of the European
Commission. We compute three measures: a proxy of uncertainty about unemployment
expectations in the next 12 months; a proxy of uncertainty about industry order-book levels;
a proxy of uncertainty about the expectations of industry production. The former is based
on answers to the following question from the consumer survey module: QUESTION: How
do you expect the number of people unemployed in this country will change over the next 12
months? ANSWER: The number will: increase sharply; increase slightly; remain the same;
fall slightly; fall sharply; don’t Know. The other two uncertainty indicators are based on the
industry survey module and rely on the answers to the following two questions. QUESTION:
Excluding seasonal variations, you expect that in volume terms your total order book for the
next three months will: ANSWERS: increase; remain the same; fall. QUESTION: Excluding
seasonal variations, you expect that in volume terms your total production for the next three
months will: ANSWERS: increase; remain the same; fall.
To construct these uncertainty measures we follow the approach of Bachmann et al.
(2013) that exploit the information contained in the dispersion of responses. Specifically,
respondents to the above-mentioned questions can be grouped in three answers: “decrease”,
“unchanged” or “increase”. Let Frac+t denote the weighted fraction of agents (consumers
or firms) in the cross-section with “increase” responses at time t, and Frac−t the weighted








This boils down to computing the standard deviation of answers in the cross-section, with
weights equal to +1, 0, −1 assigned to “increase”, “unchanged”, and “decrease” answers,
respectively.
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2.1.3 Group III: economic policy uncertainty
Individuals’ opinions about the current and future political situation: both
indexes are computed by the Spanish Center for Research on Sociology (CIS) based on their
monthly survey data.9 In particular, they rely on individuals’ answers to two questions,
asking to assess the quality of the current political situation (from very good to very bad)
and whether the political situation is expected to be worse, the same, or better in the next
future.
Indicator of political risk: this indicator is constructed by the PRS Group based
on the International Country Risk Guide methodology.10 Specifically, the index is com-
puted as a weighted average of the following variables: government stability, socio-economic
conditions, investment profile, internal conflicts, external conflicts, corruption, military in
politics, religious tensions, law and order, ethnic tensions, democratic accountability, and
bureaucracy quality.
New EPU index: we use the new and improved version of the EPU index proposed by
Baker et al. (2016),11 as computed by Ghirelli et al. (2018). Recall, the EPU index is based
on searches for keywords in the press and aims to proxy economic policy-related uncertainty
with the volume of newspapers’ articles that contain at the same time words that are related
to the notion of “uncertainty”, “economy”, and “policy”. While methodologically Ghirelli
et al. (2018) follow closely the procedure used by Baker et al. (2016), they improve the EPU
index for Spain in two ways. First, they broaden the press and time coverage. Second, they
refine the keywords used for the text-based search. Both adjustments improve the index
substantially.
Disagreement about public deficit forecasts: we compute this indicator based on
FUNCAS panel forecasts on fiscal policy following the procedure explained to construct the
9The CIS survey targets each month representative samples of the Spanish society. Both indexes are
calculated as weighted averages of the shares of responses.
10For details on the methodology see http://www.prsgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/
icrgmethodology.pdf.
11Which is available for Spain at http://www.policyuncertainty.com/europe_monthly.html. See also
Davis (2016).
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disagreement indicators in group II of Table 1. Note, since public deficit is endogenous to the
economic cycle, we isolate fiscal policy-related uncertainty by controlling the disagreement
about GDP forecasts. To do this, we regress the indicator of disagreement about fiscal policy
on the indicator of disagreement about GDP and take the residual as a genuine measure of
uncertainty about fiscal policy stances.
Disagreement about government consumption: this indicator relies on FUNCAS
panel forecasts on public consumption. It is based on the procedure explained to construct
the disagreement indicators in group II of Table 1.
2.2 Descriptive statistics of single uncertainty indicators
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics of the single uncertainty indicators considered.
These indexes are highly persistent, with coefficients above 0.7 in most of the cases. This
suggests that periods of high/low uncertainty tend to persist over time. In addition, the
distributions of these indicators show excess kurtosis (higher kurtosis values compared to
the kurtosis of a normal distribution, which is equal to 3), which implies that extreme events
or outliers explain an important part of the variance of the distribution (i.e. extreme values
of uncertainty are more likely to occur than in a normal distribution). Finally, most of the
indicators are positively skewed (i.e. the right tail of the distribution is fatter than the left
one), which indicates a higher probability of extreme positive events.
Note that, in the current globalized setting in which economies are strongly integrated
owing to trade flows and movements of people and capital, domestic agents’ decisions are
influenced by domestic and cross-border factors alike. This is particularly so in the euro
area countries, because many economic policies (in particular monetary policy) are common
to various countries. For this reason, the single uncertainty measures presented in Table
1 do not only capture genuinely domestic uncertainty, but also changes in uncertainty in
other European countries or factors of a global nature. Since this feature is inherent to the
macroeconomic uncertainty we aim to measure, we are going to take this as given when
building our synthetic indicators. However, in Section 4, when studying the impact of
Spanish macroeconomic uncertainty on economic activity, we will additionally control for
a number of measures of European macroeconomic uncertainty, in order to disentangle the
impacts of global factors from those of domestic ones.
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3 Synthetic indicators of uncertainty and stylized facts
This section describes our synthetic indicators. We construct them by means of a Principal
Component Analysis (PCA), which allows us to combine information from different specific
uncertainty indicators. The PCA is a dimension-reduction statistical method that allows to
convert a large bunch of variables to a smaller set, which still contains most of the information
contained in the former one, thereby minimizing the information loss. From the original set
of (possibly correlated) variables, this approach extracts a new set of linearly uncorrelated
variables (called principal components). These components are ordered by the share of
explained variance, so that the first component accounts for most of the variance in the data.
To calculate the principal components, we use the recursive method of Stock and Watson
(2002), which allows to exploit the data from January 1997 onwards.12 We obtain three
domain-specific synthetic indicators for the period 1997:Q1-2018:Q2, respectively related to
financial markets, the degree of economic disagreement between agents’ expectations, and
economic policy uncertainty. Our synthetic measures of uncertainty are the first principal
component extracted from the PCA, each one based on the corresponding group of single
uncertainty measures outlined in Table 1. These resulting measures are shown in Figure
1. In addition, this Figure allows to inspect whether each of the aforementioned synthetic
indicators of uncertainty show significant changes at the time of events which, a priori,
are typically associated with changes in uncertainty, such as the terrorist attacks of 11th
September 2001 in the US, the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in September 2008, or the
request for bail-out by Greece in April 2010.13
A number of facts stand out. First, both the financial uncertainty indicator and the
economic disagreement one (Figure 1a and 1b, respectively) show important spikes during
the Spanish Great recession, encompassing both the financial crisis of 2008-2009 and the
sovereign debt crisis 2010-2012, which culminated with the financial aid request from Spain
12We start from January 1997 since most of our individual indicators are available at this date (in partic-
ular, the IBEX-35 volatility and the new EPU index are available from 1997 onwards).
13Additional details on the PCA approach, like factor loadings, are available from the authors upon request.
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in June 2012. In addition, the financial uncertainty indicator reacts importantly to global
and external events, such as Brexit in June 2016 (point L in Figure 1a) or the Dot-com re-
cession in the early 2000s, as opposed to local crisis, such as the Catalan one in October 2017
(point M Figure 1a). In turn, the economic disagreement indicator does not react neither
to global/external factors nor to local political events, while it mostly captures the Spanish
Great Recession. This is understandable, since this indicator is intrinsically linked to reces-
sionary periods in which it is harder to reach a consensus on future economic prospects. By
contrast, the economic policy uncertainty indicator behave quite differently from the previous
two, as expected. For instance, instead of jumping up at the time of the Lehman Brothers
collapse, it increases gradually throughout the Great recession, reaching the highest level
at the time in which Spain asked for the bank rescue package in June 2012. Afterward, it
decreases with a similar gradual pace. In addition, the economic policy uncertainty indicator
captures political events which may lead to an increase in economic policy uncertainty (e.g.
the Catalan crisis: point M in Figure 1c). For instance, it raises at the time of the request
for the Greek bail-out in April 2010 (point H in Figure 1c) and persists at a high level after-
ward, possibly reflecting the deadlock situation that occurred before the EU interventions
were defined. Another example may refer to periods preceding national elections, which
coincide with the electoral campaigns. The latter can increase economic policy uncertainty
depending on whether the electorate believes that the announced political stands will be
followed coherently after the election’s results.14
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of our synthetic indicators of uncertainty. As ex-
pected, all indicators are counter-cyclical, i.e. they are higher in downturns than in upturns,
in line with the findings reported for other countries.15 In addition, these measures are highly
persistent, in a manner that does not seem to vary along the business cycle.
14Note, economic policy uncertainty does not necessarily have to increase during each electoral campaign.
This depends on citizens’ expectations about future policies.
15E.g. see the discussion in Bloom (2014) for the US, Moore (2017) for Australia, and references therein.
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Prominent Events
A. Jan-99 EMU constitution
B. Mar-00 General elections in Spain (ES)
C. Sep-01 Terrorist attacks (11/09)
D. Mar-03 Invasion of Iraq
E. Mar-04 Terrorist attacks & general elections in ES
F. Mar-08 Bear Sterns collapse & general elections in ES
G. Sep-08 Lehman Brothers collapse
H. Apr-10 Financial assistance for Greece
I. Nov-11 General elections in ES
J. Jun-12 Financial aid request from ES
K. Dec-15 General elections in ES
L. Jun-16 Brexit & general elections in ES
M. Oct-17 Catalan crisis
Table 2: Synthetic indicators of uncertainty
Mean Persistence‡ Kurtosis Skewness
All§ Rec./Exp.† All Rec./Exp.
Financial uncertainty -0.04 (1.37 / -0.89) 0.88 (0.91-0.89) 3.21 0.51
Economic disagreement 0.58 (2.15 / -0.37) 0.89 (0.93-0.90) 7.81 2.14
Political uncertainty 1.16 (1.77 / 0.79) 0.96 (0.95-0.96) 2.32 0.52
Notes: Sources: Own elaboration. Each synthetic indicator is the first component result-
ing from the PCA based on the corresponding group of single indicators of uncertainty
showed in Table 1.
§: Column All provides the corresponding statistic of each indicator considering the
entire period.
†: Column Rec./Exp. provides the corresponding statistic distinguishing between reces-
sions and expansions. Recessionary periods are defined based on the time-line proposed
by the Committee of experts of the Economic Spanish Association.
‡: Persistence is measured by the auto-correlation coefficient of an AR(1) model.
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Table 3: Granger causality tests
Direction Financial Economic Policy
of causality uncertainty disagreement uncertainty
GDP (2 lags) → 0.7846 0.1826 0.4884
← 0.0142 ** 4.00E-05 *** 0.0197 **
GDP (4 lags) → 0.2827 0.4257 0.3166
← 0.0707 * 1.00E-05 *** 3.00E-03 ***
UR (2 lags) → 0.3643 0.9149 0.0517 *
← 0.2133 1.00E-05 *** 0.1592
UR (4 lags) → 0.4314 0.9569 0.1599
← 0.1092 3.00E-05 *** 0.1067
Notes: P-value reported. *** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; *
significant at 10%. Quarterly data used. UR stays for unemployment
rate, while GDP refers to the GDP growth rate. In the lines in which the
direction of causality is →, the null hypothesis is that the corresponding
macroeconomic variable (GDP or UR) does not Granger-causes the cor-
responding uncertainty indicator. When the direction of causality is ←,
it is the other way around. In this exercise all uncertainty measures repre-
sent genuine Spanish-related uncertainty, accounting for global/external
uncertainty. This is obtained by removing from each uncertainty mea-
sure the effect of global/external uncertainty, which is estimated from a
regression of the former on the EPU for the EU and a constant.
4 The impact of uncertainty shocks on the economy
This section presents an analysis on the impact of increased macroeconomic uncertainty on
the Spanish economic activity as measured by GDP, private consumption and investment.
We investigate the relative role of each of the synthetic uncertainty indicator we build in
this paper. We estimate the impact of an unexpected increase in uncertainty on the Spanish
economy by means of a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) models, in which we include
as endogenous variables our three synthetic uncertainty indicators (the synthetic financial
uncertainty indicator, the synthetic indicator of uncertainty based on economic disagreement,
and the economic policy uncertainty indicator) together with one macroeconomic variable
of interest among the GDP, private consumption and investment in capital goods (one at
the time). In addition, we include the Spanish sovereign debt spread over the German
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Bund, and a price index,16 to control for possible effects of financial and nominal variables
on the uncertainty indicators. VAR models allow to control for the possible endogeneity of
the uncertainty indicators by further including lags of the variable of interest (alternatively,
GDP, private consumption or capital goods investment).
The aim of the exercise is to study impulse response functions to simulate the impact
of an unexpected shock in uncertainty on the macroeconomic variable of interest, under
the assumption that all other shocks are held constant. To do that we need to impose
some restrictions on the contemporaneous relations between the endogenous variables. We
use the Cholesky decomposition, following the same order we used to present the variables
of the model. This assumption is common to the literature and relies on the idea that
the impact of financial uncertainty affects contemporaneously unexpected economic policy
decisions as well as the overall economy. Finally, we further include as exogenous variables
the Eurostoxx-50 volatility, the EPU index for the EU as computed by Baker et al. (2016),
and a synthetic indicator of economic disagreement at the EU level, which is calculated
using the same procedure described in this paper to construct the economic disagreement
indicators for Spain.17 This way we account for sources of uncertainty that are common
to the EU area and/or external to Spain, and hence better isolate the effects of domestic
idiosyncratic shocks. The VAR models are estimated by OLS. In each model we include lags
according to the optimal lag length based on the Schwarz Information Criterion.18
Before moving to the main empirical exercise of this section, in Table 3 we test the
direction of causality between uncertainty and the business cycle, based on Granger tests,
given potential concerns with the endogeneity of our uncertainty measures. As business cycle
proxies we use alternatively the GDP growth rate and the unemployment rate. A number
of results are worth noticing. As for the financial uncertainty and the economic policy
uncertainty indicators, the tests are significant only when considering economic activity as
opposed to the labour market. In addition, the direction of causality goes from uncertainty
16We use the seasonally adjusted Consumer Price Index (CPI) excluding unprocessed food and energy,
regulated prices and VAT.
17Own calculation, based on opinion-based surveys of the European Commission for the EU as a whole.
The index is a combination of uncertainty about expectations of unemployment, industry order-book levels,
and industry production at the EU level.
18The results are robust, in qualitative terms, to the exclusion of the exogenous variables.
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to economic activity. This is reasonable, as one expects that an exogenous shock in financial
market or in economic policy uncertainty propagates into the real economy, and not the
other way around.19 Similarly, the economic disagreement indicator Granger-causes both
the GDP and the unemployment rate. All in all, this descriptive evidence tends to suggest
that, based on our synthetic uncertainty measures, it is uncertainty that affects the business
cycle and not the other way around. This reduces the endogeneity concerns when estimating
the macroeconomic effects of uncertainty shocks, which is the focus of the next Section.
Results of the impulse response exercises are shown in Figures 2, 3 and 4. Figure 2a
reports the GDP responses to unexpected one-unit standard deviation increases in the three
aforementioned synthetic measures of uncertainty, explicitly controlling for the indicators of
external uncertainty. The uncertainty shocks lead to a decrease in GDP, and this holds for
all three synthetic indicators. Both the synthetic indicator of financial uncertainty and the
synthetic indicator of economic policy uncertainty display large and persistent effects, while
the negative response to a shock in the economic disagreement indicator vanishes quickly.
Figures 2b, 2c, and 2d show the GDP response to unexpected uncertainty increases in
each of the synthetic uncertainty measures, comparing the baseline model with a model
that does not take into account external sources of uncertainty. In this latter case, the
negative GDP responses to unexpected shocks in each of the uncertainty measure are more
persistent and more statistically significant compared to the baseline results, especially in
the case of financial uncertainty. This suggests that, as expected, our Spain-related synthetic
uncertainty measures partially reflect external uncertainty shocks, which significantly affect
the dynamics of the Spanish economy. This holds also for responses in private consumption
and capital goods investment (see Figures 3b-3d and 4b-4d, respectively).
Finally, Figures 3a and 4a show the responses of private consumption and capital goods
investment to unexpected shocks in the three synthetic measures of uncertainty. Qualita-
tively, results are in line to those obtained for the GDP, i.e. an unexpected increase in
uncertainty causes a decline in private consumption and capital goods investment. In addi-
tion, private consumption responses to uncertainty shocks show a similar persistence to GDP.
19In case of economic policy uncertainty, also the other direction of causality could be possible. It would
suggests that for instance politicians may take advantage of business cycle conditions to put forward pop-
ulistic agendas, which may generate policy instability.
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This is expected, and suggests that due to an unexpected increase in uncertainty households
may increase precautionary saving, thereby reducing the resources devoted to consumption
under normal circumstances. This in turn may reduce aggregate demand. By contrast, in-
vestment responses fade away quickly from the third quarter onwards. Also this results is
consistent with theoretical predictions available in the literature. When uncertainty is high,
firms may delay new investment and hiring decisions, thereby shrinking aggregate supply in
the short-run. Moreover, the reduction in investment spending may even reduce the future
supply capacity, thereby weakening the economic growth of the economy in the long-term.
According to our results investment in Spain comes back to the initial level within a year.
Our results are in line with those obtained with similar exercises, though with a more
limited scope, for Spain. Basile and Girardi (2017) find negative GDP responses to a shock
in their proxy of uncertainty, which lasts about 5 quarters. This is in line with our GDP
responses to innovations in our financial uncertainty and economic policy uncertainty indica-
tors, but diverges from the GDP response we get after a shock in our economic disagreement
index, which shows no persistence. While it is natural to associate their proxy of uncertainty
to our synthetic indicator of economic disagreement, the two measures differ in the set of ex-
pectations they rely on. First, we add expectations of economic experts to the expectations
of firms and consumers. Second, they consider expectations about a wider set of economic
variables (including prices).20
In addition, our investment responses are in line with those found by Meinen and Roehe
(2017) for Spain. Based on SVAR models, they document negative but not persistent reac-
tions of investment to shocks in the stock market volatility, which is similar in nature to our
synthetic indicator of uncertainty in financial markets. Investment responses to innovations
in the original EPU index as well as in their measure of economic disagreement about pro-
duction’s expectations are statistically not significant. Our negative and significant - yet not
persistent - responses in investment to a shock in our synthetic indicator of economic policy
20Note, the uncertainty proxy of Basile and Girardi (2017) captures the degree of disagreement between
agents’ expectations about future economic prospects, as represented by a rich - yet heterogeneous - set
of dimensions: i.e. firms’ expectations about selling prices and employment in industry, services, retail
trade, and construction; export orders and production in industry; demand in services; orders and sales in
retail trade; consumers’ expectations about their own economic situation, and about the general economic
situation, prices and unemployment.
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uncertainty and economic disagreement can be rationalized by the specific characteristics
of our indicators. In particular, our economic policy uncertainty indicator relies on a new
improved version of the EPU index for Spain, as opposed to their measure which is based
on the original EPU index.21 On top of this, our synthetic indicator combines the informa-
tion contained in the new EPU index with the one available from other indexes related to
economic policy uncertainty.22
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we propose new macroeconomic indicators of uncertainty for Spain and study
their impact on the dynamics of GDP, private consumption, and capital goods investment.
We focus on the period 1997Q1-2018Q2. Our proposed indicators are synthetic measures
of uncertainty resulting from a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) based on a number
of specific uncertainty measures. We construct three uncertainty measures, each one refer-
ring to a specific domain: a synthetic indicator of uncertainty related to financial markets,
a synthetic indicator of disagreement between agents’ expectations over future economic
prospects, and one synthetic indicator of economic policy uncertainty. For each domain,
we select a number of specific uncertainty measures: some of these measures are already
available in the literature, while the rest is constructed by ourselves. Rather than relying
on a specific uncertainty index, we combine all information embedded in all specific uncer-
tainty indexes related to a given domain (i.e. financial markets, economic disagreement or
economic policy uncertainty) to proxy domain-specific economic uncertainties, by means of
a PCA. This methodology allows us to come up with measures of uncertainty that are more
complete and less volatile compared to each of the individual uncertainty indexes we selected
in the first place.
Based on a graphical inspection, we discuss the evolution of our synthetic indicators
against a time-line of relevant events, i.e. potentially associated to increases in economic
21For a comparison between the new EPU and the original one, see Ghirelli et al. (2018).
22Note, Meinen and Roehe (2017) find larger responses of investment to shocks in uncertainty measures
based on the unpredictable components of a set of macroeconomic variables. These results are not comparable
to ours.
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Figure 2: VAR results. Impulse responses of GDP
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Notes: VAR models include as endogenous variables the synthetic indicator of financial uncertainty, the
synthetic indicator of economic policy uncertainty, the synthetic indicator of economic disagreement,
the GDP growth rate, the Spanish sovereign debt spread over the German Bund, and a price index; in
addition, it includes as exogenous variables the volatility index of the European Stock exchange, the EPU
index by Baker et al. (2016) for the EU, and a measure of economic disagreement for the EU based on
experts’ forecasts of GDP (own calculation). All models consider the period 1997Q1:2018Q2. Quarterly
data used. Each graph shows the impulse response function up to 10 quarters after a positive shock of
one standard deviation in a specific uncertainty measure. Full circles indicate statistical significance at
5%; empty circles indicate statistical significance at 10%; solid line indicates no statistical significance.
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Figure 3: VAR results. Impulse responses of private consumption
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excluding EU uncertainty variables
Notes: VAR models include as endogenous variables the synthetic indicator of financial uncertainty, the
synthetic indicator of economic policy uncertainty, the synthetic indicator of economic disagreement,
private consumption, the Spanish sovereign debt spread over the German Bund, and a price index; in
addition, it includes as exogenous variables the volatility index of the European Stock exchange, the EPU
index by Baker et al. (2016) for the EU, and a measure of economic disagreement for the EU based on
experts’ forecasts of GDP (own calculation). All models consider the period 1997Q1:2018Q2. Quarterly
data used. Each graph shows the impulse response function up to 10 quarters after a positive shock of
one standard deviation in a specific uncertainty measure. Full circles indicate statistical significance at
5%; empty circles indicate statistical significance at 10%; solid line indicates no statistical significance.
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Figure 4: VAR results. Impulse responses of capital goods investment
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excluding EU uncertainty variables
Notes: VAR models include as endogenous variables the synthetic indicator of financial uncertainty,
the synthetic indicator of economic policy uncertainty, the synthetic indicator of economic disagreement,
capital goods investment, the Spanish sovereign debt spread over the German Bund, and a price index; in
addition, it includes as exogenous variables the volatility index of the European Stock exchange, the EPU
index by Baker et al. (2016) for the EU, and a measure of economic disagreement for the EU based on
experts’ forecasts of GDP (own calculation). All models consider the period 1997Q1:2018Q2. Quarterly
data used. Each graph shows the impulse response function up to 10 quarters after a positive shock of
one standard deviation in a specific uncertainty measure. Full circles indicate statistical significance at
5%; empty circles indicate statistical significance at 10%; solid line indicates no statistical significance.
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uncertainty. As expected, our three indicators behave differently, depending on the nature
of the information they are built upon. For instance, the indicator of financial uncertainty
strongly reacts to global/external phenomena (such as Brexit in June 2016), while it does not
capture Spanish political events (such as the Catalan crisis of October 2017). By contrast,
the indicator of economic disagreement is highly related to the Spanish Great recession,
while the economic policy uncertainty indicator is more sensitive to political events that are
associated to increased uncertainty about future political stands (e.g. electoral campaigns,
and the Catalan crisis).
In addition, we propose an empirical application in which we study the macroeconomic
impact of our uncertainty measures by means of structural vector autoregressive (SVAR)
models. We find significant and negative responses of, in turn, GPD, private consumption
and capital goods investment, to unexpected shocks in financial uncertainty as well as in
economic policy uncertainty. GDP and private consumption responses are quite persistent
(up to 5/6 quarters and 4/7 quarters depending on the uncertainty measure, respectively),
while investment responses are initially bigger in magnitude but fade away more quickly,
three quarters after the shocks.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 28 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1905
Caggiano, G., E. Castelnuovo, and J. M. Figueres (2017). Economic policy uncertainty and unemployment
in the United States: A nonlinear approach. Economics Letters 51, 31–34.
Castelnuovo, E., G. Lim, and G. Pellegrino (2017). A Short Review of the Recent Literature on Uncertainty.
Australian Economic Review 50 (1), 68–78.
Charles, A., O. Darne´, and F. Tripier (2018). Uncertainty and the macroeconomy: evidence from an
uncertainty composite indicator. Applied Economics 50 (10), 1093–1107.
Christiano, L. J., R. Motto, and M. Rostagno (2014). Risk Shocks. American Economic Review 104 (1),
27–65.
Davis, S. J. (2016, October). An Index of Global Economic Policy Uncertainty. Working Paper 22740,
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Denis, S. and P. Kannan (2013, March). The Impact of Uncertainty Shocks on the UK Economy. IMF
Working Paper No. 13/66.
Dovern, J., U. Fritsche, and J. Slacalek (2012). Disagreement Among Forecasters in G7 Countries. The
Review of Economics and Statistics 94 (4), 1081–1096.
Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, J., P. Guerro´n-Quintana, K. Kuester, and J. Rubio-Ramı´rez (2015). Fiscal Volatility
Shocks and Economic Activity. American Economic Review 105 (11).
Ghirelli, C., J. J. Pe´rez, and A. Urtasun (2018, forthcoming). A new Economic Policy Uncertainty Index for
Spain. Banco de Espan˜a Working Paper Series .
References
Arslan, Y., A. Atabek, T. Hulagu, and S. S¸ahino¨z (2015). Expectation errors, uncertainty, and economic
activity. Oxford Economic Papers 67 (3), 634–660.
Bachmann, R., S. Elstner, and E. R. Sims (2013). Uncertainty and Economic Activity: Evidence from
Business Survey Data. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 5 (2), 217–49.
Baker, S. R., N. Bloom, and S. J. Davis (2016). Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty*. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 131 (4), 1593–1636.
Basile, R. and A. Girardi (2017). Uncertainty and Business Cycle: A Review of the Literature and Some
Evidence from the Spanish Economy. Estudios de economı´a aplicada 36 (1), 235–250.
Bloom, N. (2009). The Impact of Uncertainty Shocks. Econometrica 77 (3), 623–685.
Bloom, N. (2014). Fluctuations in Uncertainty. Journal of Economic Perspectives 28 (2), 153–76.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 29 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1905
Mumtaz, H. and F. Zanetti (2013). The Impact of the Volatility of Monetary Policy Shocks. Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking 45 (4), 535–558.
Paredes, J., G. Perez-Quiros, and J. J. Perez (2015, August). Fiscal Targets. A Guide to Forecasters? ECB
Working Paper 1834.
Posada, D., A. Urtasun, and J. G. Mı´nguez (2014, June). Un ana´lisis del comportamiento reciente de la
inversio´n en equipo y de sus determinantes. Bolet´ın Econo´mico del Banco de Espan˜a,pp. 41-50. pp 41-50.
Rossi, B. and T. Sekhposyan (2015). Macroeconomic Uncertainty Indices Based on Nowcast and Forecast
Error Distributions. American Economic Review 105 (5), 650–55.
Stock, J. H. and M. W. Watson (2002). Forecasting Using Principal Components From a Large Number of
Predictors. Journal of the American Statistical Association 97 (460), 1167–1179.
Zalla, R. (2017). Economic Policy Uncertainty in Ireland. Atlantic Economic Journal 45 (2), 269–271.
Gil, M., J. J. Pe´rez, and A. Urtasun (2017, February). Macroeconomic uncertainty: measurement and impact
on the Spanish economy. Banco de Espan˜a Working Paper Series .
Guiso, L. and G. Parigi (1999). Investment and Demand Uncertainty. The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 114 (1), 185–227.
Haddow, A., C. Hare, J. Hooley, and T. Shakir (2013). Macroeconomic uncertainty: what is it, how can we
measure it and why does it matter? Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 53 (2), 100–109.
Jurado, K., S. C. Ludvigson, and S. Ng (2015). Measuring uncertainty. American Economic Review 105 (3),
1177–1216.
Meinen, P. and O. Roehe (2017). On measuring uncertainty and its impact on investment: Cross-country
evidence from the euro area. European Economic Review 92, 161–179.
Moore, A. (2017). Measuring Economic Uncertainty and Its Effects. Economic Record 93 (303), 550–575.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA PUBLICATIONS 
WORKING PAPERS  
1801  OLYMPIA BOVER, LAURA HOSPIDO and ERNESTO VILLANUEVA: The impact of high school financial education on 
financial knowledge and choices: evidence from a randomized trial in Spain.
1802  IGNACIO HERNANDO, IRENE PABLOS, DANIEL SANTABÁRBARA and JAVIER VALLÉS: Private Saving. New Cross-
Country Evidence Based on Bayesian Techniques.
1803  PABLO AGUILAR and JESÚS VÁZQUEZ: Term structure and real-time learning.
1804  MORITZ A. ROTH: International co-movements in recessions.
1805  ANGELA ABBATE and DOMINIK THALER: Monetary policy and the asset risk-taking channel.
1806  PABLO MARTÍN-ACEÑA: Money in Spain. New historical statistics. 1830-1998.
1807  GUILHERME BANDEIRA: Fiscal transfers in a monetary union with sovereign risk.
1808  MIGUEL GARCÍA-POSADA GÓMEZ: Credit constraints, fi rm investment and growth: evidence from survey data.
1809  LAURA ALFARO, MANUEL GARCÍA-SANTANA and ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO: On the direct and indirect real 
effects of credit supply shocks.
1810  ROBERTO RAMOS and CARLOS SANZ: Backing the incumbent in diffi cult times: the electoral impact of wildfi res.
1811  GABRIEL JIMÉNEZ, ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO and RAQUEL VEGAS: Bank lending standards over the cycle: 
the role of fi rms’ productivity and credit risk.
1812  JUAN S. MORA-SANGUINETTI and ROK SPRUK: Industry vs services: do enforcement institutions matter for 
specialization patterns? Disaggregated evidence from Spain.
1813  JAMES CLOYNE, CLODOMIRO FERREIRA and PAOLO SURICO: Monetary policy when households have debt: new 
evidence on the transmission mechanism.
1814  DMITRI KIRPICHEV and ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO: The costs of trade protectionism: evidence from Spanish fi rms 
and non-tariff measures.
1815  ISABEL ARGIMÓN, CLEMENS BONNER, RICARDO CORREA, PATTY DUIJM, JON FROST, JAKOB DE HAAN, 
LEO DE HAAN and VIKTORS STEBUNOVS: Financial institutions’ business models and the global transmission of 
monetary policy.
1816  JOSE ASTURIAS, MANUEL GARCÍA-SANTANA and ROBERTO RAMOS: Competition and the welfare gains from 
transportation infrastructure: evidence from the Golden Quadrilateral of India.
1817  SANDRA GARCÍA-URIBE: Multidimensional media slant: complementarities in news reporting by US newspapers .
1818  PILAR CUADRADO, AITOR LACUESTA, MARÍA DE LOS LLANOS MATEA and F. JAVIER PALENCIA-GONZÁLEZ: 
Price strategies of independent and branded dealers in retail gas market. The case of a contract reform in Spain.
1819  ALBERTO FUERTES, RICARDO GIMENO and JOSÉ MANUEL MARQUÉS: Extraction of infl ation expectations from 
fi nancial instruments in Latin America.
1820  MARIO ALLOZA, PABLO BURRIEL and JAVIER J. PÉREZ: Fiscal policies in the euro area: revisiting the size of spillovers.
1821  MARTA MARTÍNEZ-MATUTE and ALBERTO URTASUN: Uncertainty, fi rm heterogeneity and labour adjustments. 
Evidence from European countries.
1822  GABRIELE FIORENTINI, ALESSANDRO GALESI, GABRIEL PÉREZ-QUIRÓS and ENRIQUE SENTANA: The rise and fall 
of the natural interest rate.
1823  ALBERTO MARTÍN, ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO and TOM SCHMITZ: The fi nancial transmission of housing bubbles: 
evidence from Spain.
1824  DOMINIK THALER: Sovereign default, domestic banks and exclusion from international capital markets.
1825  JORGE E. GALÁN and JAVIER MENCÍA: Empirical assessment of alternative structural methods for identifying cyclical 
systemic risk in Europe.
1826  ROBERTO BLANCO and NOELIA JIMÉNEZ: Credit allocation along the business cycle: evidence from the latest boom 
bust credit cycle in Spain.
1827  ISABEL ARGIMÓN: The relevance of currency-denomination for the cross-border effects of monetary policy.
1828 SANDRA GARCÍA-URIBE: The effects of tax changes on economic activity: a narrative approach to frequent anticipations.
1829 MATÍAS CABRERA, GERALD P. DWYER and MARÍA J. NIETO: The G-20 regulatory agenda and bank risk.
1830 JACOPO TIMINI and MARINA CONESA: Chinese exports and non-tariff measures: testing for heterogeneous effects at the
 product level.
1831  JAVIER ANDRÉS, JOSÉ E. BOSCÁ, JAVIER FERRI and CRISTINA FUENTES-ALBERO: Households’ balance sheets and
the effect of fi scal policy.
1832  ÓSCAR ARCE, MIGUEL GARCÍA-POSADA, SERGIO MAYORDOMO and STEVEN ONGENA: Adapting lending policies 
when negative interest rates hit banks’ profi ts.
1833  VICENTE SALAS, LUCIO SAN JUAN and JAVIER VALLÉS: Corporate cost and profi t shares in the euro area and the US: 
the same story?
1834  MARTÍN GONZÁLEZ-EIRAS and CARLOS SANZ: Women’s representation in politics: voter bias, party bias, and electoral 
systems.
1835  MÓNICA CORREA-LÓPEZ and BEATRIZ DE BLAS: Faraway, so close! Technology diffusion and fi rm heterogeneity in the 
medium term cycle of advanced economies.
1836  JACOPO TIMINI: The margins of trade: market entry and sector spillovers, the case of Italy (1862-1913).
1837  HENRIQUE S. BASSO and OMAR RACHEDI: The young, the old, and the government: demographics and fi scal 
multipliers.
1838  PAU ROLDÁN and SONIA GILBUKH: Firm dynamics and pricing under customer capital accumulation.
1839  GUILHERME BANDEIRA, JORDI CABALLÉ and EUGENIA VELLA: Should I stay or should I go? Austerity, 
unemployment and migration.
1840  ALESSIO MORO and OMAR RACHEDI: The changing structure of government consumption spending.
1841  GERGELY GANICS, ATSUSHI INOUE and BARBARA ROSSI: Confi dence intervals for bias and size distortion in IV
and local projections – IV models.
1842  MARÍA GIL, JAVIER J. PÉREZ, A. JESÚS SÁNCHEZ and ALBERTO URTASUN: Nowcasting private consumption: 
traditional indicators, uncertainty measures, credit cards and some internet data.
1843  MATÍAS LAMAS and JAVIER MENCÍA: What drives sovereign debt portfolios of banks in a crisis context?
1844  MIGUEL ALMUNIA, POL ANTRÀS, DAVID LÓPEZ-RODRÍGUEZ and EDUARDO MORALES: Venting out: exports during 
a domestic slump.
1845  LUCA FORNARO and FEDERICA ROMEI: The paradox of global thrift.
1846  JUAN S. MORA-SANGUINETTI and MARTA MARTÍNEZ-MATUTE: An economic analysis of court fees: evidence from 
the Spanish civil jurisdiction.
1847  MIKEL BEDAYO, ÁNGEL ESTRADA and JESÚS SAURINA: Bank capital, lending booms, and busts. Evidence from 
Spain in the last 150 years.
1848  DANIEL DEJUÁN and CORINNA GHIRELLI: Policy uncertainty and investment in Spain.
1849  CRISTINA BARCELÓ and ERNESTO VILLANUEVA: The risk of job loss, household formation and housing demand: 
evidence from differences in severance payments.
1850  FEDERICO TAGLIATI: Welfare effects of an in-kind transfer program: evidence from Mexico.
1851  ÓSCAR ARCE, GALO NUÑO, DOMINIK THALER and CARLOS THOMAS: A large central bank balance sheet? Floor vs 
corridor systems in a New Keynesian environment.
1901  EDUARDO GUTIÉRREZ and ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO: Trade and credit: revisiting the evidence.
1902 LAURENT CAVENAILE and PAU ROLDAN: Advertising, innovation and economic growth.
1903  DESISLAVA C. ANDREEVA and MIGUEL GARCÍA-POSADA: The impact of the ECB’s targeted long-term refi nancing 
operations on banks’ lending policies: the role of competition.
1904  ANDREA ALBANESE, CORINNA GHIRELLI and MATTEO PICCHIO: Timed to say goodbye: does unemployment 
benefi t eligibility affect worker layoffs?
1905  CORINNA GHIRELLI, MARÍA GIL, JAVIER J. PÉREZ and ALBERTO URTASUN: Measuring economic and economic 
policy uncertainty, and their macroeconomic effects: the case of Spain
Unidad de Servicios Auxiliares
Alcalá, 48 - 28014 Madrid
E-mail: publicaciones@bde.es
www.bde.es
